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REGULATION X: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE
REGULATION OF MORTGAGE SERVICERS
ABSTRACT
Mortgage servicers are responsible for handling the day-to-day processing
of mortgage loans. These responsibilities include processing borrower
payments, transferring funds to trustees and investors, and answering
borrower inquiries. Mortgage servicers are also responsible for handling
delinquent loans when a borrower is late making payments. If a borrower does
not cure the delinquency, mortgage servicers are responsible for choosing
whether to pursue a foreclosure sale or to implement a loss mitigation option.
Foreclosures are detrimental to borrowers and the surrounding
community. Forcing a borrower to leave her home creates a negative feedback
loop, lowering property values in the surrounding area. Loss mitigation
options are pursued as an alternative to avoid the harmful effects of
foreclosures.
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 brought to light mortgage servicer
behavior that pushed through an unnecessary number of foreclosures, even
where borrowers had finalized loss mitigation negotiations with mortgage
servicers. Reports attribute these foreclosures to miscommunication between
servicers and borrowers and poor internal communication within servicers.
The unprecedented number of foreclosures exacerbated the severity of the
financial crisis.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the Bureau), created by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, has
finalized new regulations aimed at stopping the servicing behavior that
contributed to such unnecessary foreclosures. The new regulations are
amendments to Regulation X, the implementing regulation of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act. The amendments, proposed under the Bureau’s
broad rulemaking power, require servicers to make early contact with
delinquent borrowers, implement continuity-of-contact procedures, and
establish loss mitigation application review procedures. This Comment
explores the Bureau’s enforcement powers and the legality of the amendments
as permissible expressions of the Bureau’s rulemaking authority. This
Comment concludes that the broad deference to federal agencies under step
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two of the Chevron doctrine includes the amendments within the scope of the
Bureau’s rulemaking power.
This Comment also addresses the immediate and potential effects of the
amendments. The amendments’ immediate effects are uniformity of industry
standards and data creation. The Bureau is equipped with stronger
supervisory and enforcement powers than any previous federal agency in this
field. The amendments create an observable record of servicer behavior that
will allow the Bureau to efficiently enforce federal consumer protection law,
bringing greater accountability to the mortgage servicing industry. Despite
this strong immediate effect, the amendments leave room for servicer
discretion and manipulation, which would leave borrowers exposed to the
prospect of unnecessary foreclosures.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 177
I. MORTGAGE SERVICERS: DECIDING TO IMPLEMENT A LOSS MITIGATION
OPTION .............................................................................................. 180
A. Mortgage Servicers’ Obligations and Responsibilities ............ 181
B. Comparing Loss Mitigation Options and Foreclosure ............. 184
C. Choosing Between Loss Mitigation Options and Foreclosure . 187
D. The Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 .......................................... 189
II. THE REGULATION X AMENDMENTS .................................................. 191
A. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ............................ 191
1. Creating the Bureau ........................................................... 191
2. The Bureau’s Powers ......................................................... 193
B. Amendments to Regulation X .................................................... 194
1. Recordkeeping Requirements ............................................. 196
2. Facilitating
and
Recording
Servicer–Borrower
Communication .................................................................. 196
3. Loss Mitigation Procedures ............................................... 199
III. AGENCY RULEMAKING UNDER THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE ................ 201
A. Substantive Validity .................................................................. 203
B. Procedural Validity .................................................................. 206
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF AMENDMENTS .................................................... 210
A. Immediate Effects ..................................................................... 211
1. Industry Unity ..................................................................... 211
2. Data Creation ..................................................................... 212
B. Potential Gaps for Further Regulation .................................... 214
1. No Requirements for Choosing and Evaluating Loss Mitigation
Options ............................................................................... 214

DEWAR GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

9/24/2013 12:11 PM

REGULATION X

177

2. No Legal Safe Haven for Servicer Decisions ..................... 217
3. Dual-Track and Preemption Concerns ............................... 217
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 219
INTRODUCTION
Mortgage servicers are responsible for the day-to-day processing of
mortgage loans. This includes processing payments, communicating with
borrowers and investors, and handling escrow accounts.1 Additionally, when a
borrower defaults on her loan, servicers are responsible for proceeding with a
foreclosure sale, which can be detrimental to the borrower and the surrounding
community, or avoiding foreclosure by implementing various loss mitigation
options.2 Because the residential mortgage market is the single largest market
for consumer financial products and services in the United States, servicers are
charged with immense responsibility.3
Poor lending practices during the 1990s and early 2000s led to a wave of
borrower delinquencies, causing the financial crisis of 2007–2008.4 Mortgage
servicers, who faced very little government oversight and regulation, were
unprepared to handle the wave of defaults. Borrowers, who in previous years
might have had the opportunity to pursue a loss mitigation option, were pushed
through hasty foreclosures.5 The increase in foreclosures increased the harm to
borrowers and communities, creating a negative feedback loop.6
As one response to the financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act).7
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act created a new agency, the Consumer Financial
1 See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE SERVICING COMPENSATION DISCUSSION
PAPER 3 (2011), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/22663/ServicingCompDiscussionPaperFinal0927
11.pdf.
2 See id. at 4.
3 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed.
Reg. 10,696, 10,699 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). The residential mortgage market
totals $10.3 trillion in outstanding loans. Id.
4 See CATE REAVIS, MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008: THE ROLE OF
GREED, FEAR, AND OLIGARCHS 3–5 (2009), available at https://mitsloan.mit.edu/MSTIR/world-economy/
Crisis-2008-2009/Documents/09-093%20The%20Financial%20Crisis%20of%202008.Rev.pdf.
5 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. 57,200, 57,251 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
6 See Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis, 55 ARIZ. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6–7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2254662.
7 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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Protection Bureau (the Bureau), charged exclusively with regulating the
services and products in the consumer financial market.8 The Bureau’s goals
are to protect borrowers by creating transparency and accountability.9
Congress granted the Bureau broad rulemaking and enforcement powers to
accomplish these goals.10
The Bureau used its rulemaking powers to promulgate a new rule with
stricter requirements for mortgage servicers. The new rule amends nine areas
of Regulation X, the implementing regulation of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA).11 Four of the amendments are promulgated under
the Bureau’s broad rulemaking power.12 The first amendment requires
servicers to implement general recordkeeping procedures.13 The second
requires early contact with delinquent borrowers.14 The third requires servicers
to maintain a point of contact with borrowers,15 and the fourth requires
servicers to implement procedures for the review of loss mitigation
applications.16 These regulations are generally aimed at monitoring servicer
behavior and preventing borrowers from undergoing unnecessary
foreclosures.17
The regulations trigger two questions that prompt further inquiry. The
answers to these questions are addressed in this Comment. The first question is
whether the Bureau has properly interpreted its grant of broad rulemaking
power from Congress, which gave the Bureau the authority to issue any rules
necessary to achieve the Dodd-Frank Act’s consumer protection goals. An
8 See DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
(CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS 9 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42572.pdf.
9 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,844 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); Richard Cordray, Dir.,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Field Hearing on
Mortgage Policy (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-ofrichard-cordray-at-the-mortgage-servicing-field-hearing/ (describing how the new regulations will provide
borrowers with a “fairer” process).
10 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1052–1054, 1056, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5562–5564, 5566 (Supp. V 2012).
11 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 57,200.
12 See id. at 57,206.
13 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed.
Reg. at 10,882–83 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38).
14 Id. at 10,883 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39).
15 Id. at 10,883–84 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40).
16 Id. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41).
17 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1052–1056, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5562–
5566.
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agency’s interpretation of a federal statute is evaluated under the Chevron
doctrine.18 This Comment advocates that under the second step of Chevron, the
Bureau’s amendments to Regulation X are proper interpretations of its
rulemaking authority granted by the Dodd-Frank Act.
The second question is what the amendments achieve. The amendments’
immediate effects are the creation of a uniform set of mortgage servicing
standards and a large data record that is accessible to the Bureau and other
federal agencies. The Bureau will be able to track servicer behavior and ensure
compliance with federal laws through these data. If a servicer fails to comply
with federal consumer protection laws, the Bureau can initiate a strong
enforcement action.19
Yet despite the amendments’ strong oversight effect, there are remaining
regulatory gaps over mortgage servicers. Under the amendments, servicers are
still able to exercise their discretion in loss mitigation decisions that will block
borrower access to affordable loan modifications and keep borrowers exposed
to unnecessary foreclosures.20 This Comment contends that further regulation
is required to fill in these gaps.
Although further regulation is needed, this Comment asserts that the
Regulation X amendments are a move in the right direction to provide more
transparency and accountability for consumers in mortgage servicing. Part I
provides background on mortgage servicers’ duties and the requirements to
which they are subject, including pooling and servicing agreements and
RESPA. It explains what loss mitigation and foreclosure are, compares the
outcomes for borrowers under those options, and explores how a servicer
chooses between pursuing loss mitigation and foreclosure. This background on
loss mitigation is important in understanding why the Regulation X
amendments are necessary and the impact that the amendments will have on
borrowers applying for loss mitigation options after the amendments’
implementation.

18

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5562–5566.
20 See, e.g., Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X),
78 Fed. Reg. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)) (declaring explicitly that mortgage servicers
do not have a duty to provide borrowers with any loss mitigation option); see also Press Release, Nat’l
Consumer Law Ctr., CFPB Urged to Strengthen Rules to Stem the Tide of Foreclosures, (Oct. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/pr-cfpb-servicing-rules-tila-respa.pdf (noting that the
new regulations do not put any restrictions on the net present value calculations used by servicers to evaluate
loss mitigation options).
19
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Part II explains the Bureau’s enforcement, supervisory, and rulemaking
powers. Understanding these powers is key to understanding how the Bureau
promulgated the amendments and how it will enforce them. Part II also
unpacks the Regulation X amendments that were promulgated under the
Bureau’s broad rulemaking power and describes the new obligations with
which mortgage servicers will be obligated to comply. Because the
amendments are promulgated under the broad rulemaking requirements, Part
III examines whether these amendments are authorized expressions of the
Bureau’s rulemaking power. Part III concludes that the amendments are within
the Bureau’s rulemaking power and should be given deference under the
Chevron doctrine by a reviewing court.
Satisfied that the rules are permissible expressions of the Bureau’s power,
Part IV explores the amendments’ effects and identifies any remaining gaps
requiring further regulation. Part IV asserts that the amendments’ immediate
effects are the creation of a unifying set of standards applicable to all mortgage
servicers and a recordkeeping system that allows the Bureau to efficiently
enforce federal consumer protection law. The data creation and unified set of
standards should address many of the concerns over servicer behavior that
contributed to the wave of foreclosures during the financial crisis, as discussed
in Part I.D.
Part IV advocates for further regulation to fill various gaps in the
amendments. Such regulations would include standardized net present value
calculation procedures, a legal safe haven for servicers who opt to modify
loans in a securitized pool, and clarification of the amendments’ preemption of
state law and the dual-track system. Part IV explains that these additional
regulations would be additional steps to stop servicers from pushing through
convenient foreclosures and avoiding providing borrowers with affordable loss
mitigation options.
I. MORTGAGE SERVICERS: DECIDING TO IMPLEMENT A LOSS MITIGATION
OPTION
This Part first explains a mortgage servicer’s duties and responsibilities
through its relationship with borrowers as compared to the servicer’s
relationship with trustees and investors and under RESPA. This Part then
discusses the differences between loss mitigation options and foreclosure and
how servicers decide whether to implement a loss mitigation option or proceed
with foreclosure. This Part concludes by discussing mortgage servicers’ role in
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the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This background is important to understand the
ramifications of unnecessary foreclosures and identify the aspects of mortgage
servicing that the Regulation X amendments intend to fix and the gaps that this
Comment argues remain to be regulated.
A. Mortgage Servicers’ Duties and Responsibilities
After mortgage loans are given to borrowers by lenders, the responsibilities
for the loans are passed on to mortgage servicers. Mortgage servicing is
performed by a variety of entities, including banks, thrifts, credit unions, and
nonbanks.21 Although historically loan originators serviced the loans they
produced, today over half of mortgage servicers are not affiliated with the
originators.22 The borrower does not have any choice as to which mortgage
servicer is charged with servicing the loan as servicers are assigned to
borrowers, not selected by them.23
A servicer contractually acquires the rights to a pool of private-label
securities24 when it enters into a pooling and servicing agreement (PSA) with
the trust that owns the residential mortgage-backed securities.25 A servicer’s
duties, payment rights, and responsibilities for performance are outlined in the
PSA.26 A servicer’s broad responsibility is to manage the relationships among
21 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed.
Reg. at 10,699.
22 See Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan
Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV. 755, 765, 767 (2011). Some scholars believe this disconnect has contributed
to the lack of transparency and accountability in the mortgage market. See id. at 763.
23 See Cordray, supra note 9 (noting that the borrower’s relationship with its servicer is not voluntary).
24 “Private-label securities” are pools of loans backed by mortgages that are securitized by a private
institution, such as a brokerage firm or a bank. Mortgage Backed Securities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last modified July 23, 2010). Unlike some government-sponsored enterprises,
such as the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), private-label loans are not backed by
the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, meaning there is no guarantee that investors will receive
principal and interest payments on outstanding securities in a timely manner. Id.; see Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs), GINNIE MAE, http://www.ginniemae.gov/Pages/faq.aspx?cat=Consumer%20Education&
subcat=All%20Subcategories&search= (last modified May 24, 2013, 8:57 AM).
25 See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 2; DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
WHY SERVICERS FORECLOSE WHEN THEY SHOULD MODIFY AND OTHER PUZZLES OF SERVICER BEHAVIOR:
SERVICER COMPENSATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3–4 (2009). When residential mortgages are securitized,
thousands of loans are held in common ownership and ownership is centrally held by a trust. Id. at 3. Bonds
are then issued from the trust and the bonds give investors the right to different categories of payment. Id.
These different payment rights are known as “tranches.” Id. The trustee manages the securitized loan pool on
behalf of the investors. Id. at 4. Thus, the investors and the trustee have different relationships with the
mortgage servicer. Id.
26 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 783.
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the borrower, the servicer, the guarantor, the investors, and the trustee of a
loan.27 Servicers are contractually obligated to maximize the benefit for
investors in a trust.28 The trustee has the right and duty to terminate a servicer’s
contract if the servicer fails to act in the best interest of the trust.29 Servicers,
under standard PSAs, do not have a similar contractual duty to act in the
interest of the borrower.
Mortgage servicers are charged with the day-to-day processing and
monitoring of mortgage loans.30 They process monthly payments, maintain
records, manage escrow accounts, and communicate with borrowers by
answering borrower inquiries, distributing tax information, and responding to
payoff requests.31 Servicers are also responsible for reporting information and
distributing payments to investors, guarantors, and trustees.32 Servicers may
also be responsible for payments to third parties such as tax and insurance
payments from escrow accounts and to insurance companies for force-placed
insurance.33
Servicers remain responsible for a loan once the borrower has become
delinquent in payments or otherwise defaults under the mortgage documents.
When a borrower fails to make payments, the servicer is obligated under the
PSA to advance principal, interest, or both to the investor plus other advances
such as taxes and insurance.34 The servicer is also obligated under the PSA to
initiate contact with borrower, identify possible solutions based on a
borrower’s situation, and refer the loan to foreclosure if a solution cannot be
found.35 If the property is foreclosed on, then the servicer is responsible for
conducting the foreclosure process.36

27

See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 2.
See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 37).
29 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 765–66 (citing INDYMAC MBS INC., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT S-12
80–81(2007)).
30 See id.
31 See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 3.
32 See id.
33 See id.; Making Payments to Your Mortgage Servicer, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June 2010), http://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0190-making-payments-your-mortgage-servicer.
34 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 3–4.
35 See id. at 4.
36 See id.
28
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Despite the numerous obligations for servicers in a PSA, the documents for
private-label securities typically give limited guidance to servicers.37 Such lack
of guidance historically has not been problematic because servicing
requirements are generally routine.38 During good economic conditions,
mortgage servicers have been seen as “little more than . . . processing
centers.”39 However, when there are high default rates on loans, such as during
the financial crisis that began in late 2007,40 mortgage servicers are responsible
for making significant decisions, such as whether to foreclose on a large
number of homes or pursue loss mitigation options.41 Other than the broad
obligation to maximize the economic interest of investors, PSAs give servicers
broad discretion in deciding between foreclosure and loss mitigation
solutions.42
Beyond the duties outlined in the PSA, mortgage servicers are responsible
for duties described in RESPA. RESPA was enacted to “regulate[] settlement
services provided in connection with residential real estate transactions and
requires certain disclosures in mortgage transactions.”43 Required disclosures
include the following: (1) whether the lender intends to service the mortgage
loan, (2) transfer of the servicing rights, and (3) escrow account management
details.44 RESPA also requires servicers to respond to qualified written
requests, such as information requests, but has limited this responsibility to
requests regarding the “‘servicing’ of the borrower’s mortgage loan.”45 The
duties in RESPA, unamended by the Dodd-Frank Act, have provided limited
protection for borrowers.
37 See Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicing: Myths and Realities 13, 17, 21 (Fed.
Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2008-46, 2008) (discussing the limited
guidance to servicers regarding loss mitigation and foreclosure decisions).
38 Examples of routine servicing requirements include applying payments to a borrower’s account and
passing payments on to trusts or investors. Thompson, supra note 22, at 765.
39 Id. at 767.
40 See infra Part I.C.
41 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 765.
42 See id. at 770; Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 17–18.
43 Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the
Twenty-first Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1148 (2012) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831b, 2601–2610, 2614–
2617 (2006)).
44 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. 57,200, 57,204 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024) (citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 2605(a)–(e)); Your Rights and the Responsibilities of the Mortgage Servicer, U.S. DEPARTMENT HOUSING &
URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/ramh/res/rightsmtgesrvcr (last
visited July 30, 2013) [hereinafter HUD].
45 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 57,204 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e), 2609); see also HUD, supra note 44.
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B. Comparing Loss Mitigation Options and Foreclosure46
If a borrower defaults on her mortgage payments, servicers are obligated
under PSAs to maximize recovery of the remaining amount due on behalf of
the investors. There are two ways that a servicer can maximize such recovery
of the amount owed by the borrower: proceed with foreclosure or develop a
loss mitigation strategy.47
A foreclosure allows investors to recover their investments by cashing in
on the value of the underlying property. Although recovery through a
foreclosure may be beneficial for investors, foreclosures are harmful for
borrowers. A foreclosure forces a borrower out of her home, oftentimes
without allowing the borrower to recover any equity she has built up, and may
expose the borrower to a deficiency action. On average, homes sell at
foreclosure sales at a 27% discount to the fair market price.48 Foreclosures
lower a borrower’s credit score and accumulate enormous legal and servicing
fees, making future financing very difficult to find.49 One study found that the
administrative costs of a foreclosure, including legal fees and property
protection fees, are estimated at $7,200 per property.50 As many as ten million
borrowers are currently at risk of foreclosure nationwide.51

46

Different industries have various views on the relationship between foreclosure and loss mitigation.
From an investor perspective, foreclosure may be seen as a subset of loss mitigation because the foreclosure
sale allows the investor to mitigate the loss on his investment. From a regulatory perspective, loss mitigation
and foreclosure may be viewed as alternative approaches to a default, in which case loss mitigation is
understood as avoiding foreclosure. The view that loss mitigation and foreclosure are two separate categories
is the view that the Bureau takes in the Regulation X amendments and is the view that this Comment endorses.
See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg.
10,696, 10,888 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.31).
47 PSAs restrict the circumstances under which loans that remain in the securitized pool can be modified
in order to maintain the trust’s status as a passively managed entity and receive favorable tax treatment. PSAs
generally permit modification of a loan where the loan is in default or where default is reasonably foreseeable.
THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 5–6. A servicer can modify as many loans as it would like so long as the servicer
is “prepared to purchase the modified loans out of the loan pool.” Id at 6.
48 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 5).
49 See id.; Julia Gordon, Dir. of Hous., Fin. & Policy, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Remarks at the CFPB Field
Hearing on Mortgage Policy (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/live-fromatlanta-ga/.
50 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,858 (citing FAMILY HOUS. FUND, COST EFFECTIVENESS OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
PREVENTION: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS (1998), available at http://www.fhfund.org/_dnld/reports/MFP_1995.
pdf).
51 See Cordray, supra note 9.

DEWAR GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

9/24/2013 12:11 PM

REGULATION X

185

Beyond the negative impact wrought on individual borrowers, foreclosures
produce a negative feedback loop within communities.52 Foreclosures cause
surrounding housing prices to drop by flooding the market with available
properties and leaving houses as vacant lots.53 The depression of home prices
harms a neighborhood or county by reducing property tax revenues and
increasing the number of vacant homes available to squatters and vandals.54
Some scholars have even gone so far as to blame foreclosures for the rise of
the West Nile Virus since unoccupied foreclosed homes result in stagnant
waters such as in swimming pools.55
Loss mitigation helps borrowers avoid foreclosures.56 Although loss
mitigation programs and policies are a long-standing practice for commercial
real estate loans, servicers have been hesitant to adopt a strong loss mitigation
practice in the residential context.57 Scholars argue that increasing the use of
loss mitigation options for residential mortgages is better for investors and
borrowers.58 First, investors can generally expect to receive a greater return
from borrower performance of a loss mitigation option than can be recovered
at a foreclosure sale.59 Second, loss mitigation can prevent the negative
externalities that arise from foreclosure when borrowers are able to stay in
their homes.60
There are two primary types of loss mitigation options. The first are
“workouts” and are aimed at helping borrowers stay in their homes and allow
servicers to have an ongoing relationship with borrowers.61 Workout options
include (1) forbearance plans (the lender temporarily lowers the borrower’s
monthly payments to give her the opportunity to catch up on payments

52

See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 6–7).
See id.; see generally Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, The Impact of Vacant, TaxDelinquent and Foreclosed Property on Sales Prices of Neighboring Homes (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Working Paper No. 11-23R, 2012) (finding a strong connection between vacant and foreclosed homes on the
value of surrounding homes).
54 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 7).
55 See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6 (2011).
56 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. 57,200, 57,218 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
57 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 759.
58 See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 5–6) (noting that the revenue effect of payments on
performing loans plus high loss rates on distressed loans leaves “room for investors and banks to cut their
losses by agreeing to workouts of troubled loans”).
59 See id. (manuscript at 4–5).
60 See id. (manuscript at 4, 6).
61 See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7.
53
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although the borrower is still liable for the entire debt),62 (2) loan modifications
(changes to the loan terms such as an extended term, reduced interest rate,
lowered principal, or a combination),63 and (3) capitalization (adds the
borrower’s missed back payments to the principal amount).64
The second type of loss mitigation option is called “liquidation.”65 These
options result in borrowers losing their homes.66 Liquidation options include
(1) short sales (the house is sold for less than the full amount of unpaid
principal) and (2) deeds in lieu of foreclosure (the property title is voluntarily
transferred from the homeowner to the lender).67
Loss mitigation options and foreclosures are not necessarily exclusive. In
the dual-track system, a servicer may proceed with the foreclosure process
while concurrently negotiating or implementing loss mitigation options.68 The
dual-track system is mandated by the rating criteria for credit rating agencies69
and the contractual requirements of most PSAs.70 A servicer who does not
participate in the dual-track system risks breaching obligations in the PSA and
receiving a lower credit rating.71 The dual-track requirement was originally
instituted to minimize delay during the foreclosure process.72 Unfortunately,
the dual-track system often leads to needless foreclosures since loss mitigation
62

See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 14); Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7.
See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7.
64 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 14).
65 See id.
66 See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7.
67 Id.
68 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 794–95.
69 See id. at 794, 799–800. Credit rating agencies use “not delaying foreclosure” as criteria for their
residential mortgage servicer ratings. McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 45). The ratings given to mortgage
servicers by credit rating agencies factor into how much a servicer “must bid for servicing rights” and
influence a servicer’s “ability to acquire new mortgage servicing rights and the servicer[’s] ongoing cost of
credit.” THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 14. See generally What Credit Ratings Are & Are Not, STANDARD &
POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/RatingsManual_PrintGuide.html (last visited
Aug. 15, 2013) (explaining how Standard & Poor’s, a leading rating agency, uses credit ratings).
70 Trusts generally require that foreclosure options be pursued even if loss mitigation efforts have been
initiated. See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 13.
71 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 794.
72 See id. at 795–96 (citing Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 8 (2010) (statement of Donald
Bisenius). The concern for delay during the foreclosure process as justification for the dual-track system is
more relevant in fast, nonjudicial foreclosure states, such as Georgia and Texas, where a foreclosure can be
finalized in less than six weeks, than in judicial foreclosure states with longer foreclosure times, such as
Florida or Ohio where foreclosures take an average of 135 and 217 days respectively. See Foreclosure Laws
and Procedures by State, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-laws/foreclosure-lawscomparison.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
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and foreclosure are handled by two separate departments within mortgage
servicers and communication between the two departments is imperfect.73
C. Choosing Between Loss Mitigation Options and Foreclosure
Servicers evaluate foreclosure and loss mitigation options by comparing the
net present value (NPV) calculations for each available option.74 NPV
represents the present value of the money that the servicer would expect to
receive from implementing a course of action.75 Servicers consider three
factors when calculating NPV: (1) the risk that a modified loan will redefault,
(2) the possibility that a delinquent borrower will self-cure and resume
payments on her own without servicer action, and (3) the discount rate to apply
to the reduced stream of revenue from a loan modification.76 Servicers are
virtually unrestrained by regulations or provisions in the PSAs when
determining the values or formulae for NPV calculations.77 Servicers
determine the likely foreclosure price, the discount rate, and “the likelihood
that the borrower will redefault.”78
The lack of guidance means servicers have a large amount of discretion in
determining which values go into an NPV calculation. A servicer can
manipulate an NPV calculation to justify a decision to pursue a loss mitigation
option or foreclosure.79 Servicers are influenced by several factors including
incurring additional expenditures and the probability of recouping costs,
servicer compensation, and the existence of junior liens on the property.80

73

See Thompson, supra note 22, at 794, 830.
See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 37).
75 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Home Affordable Mortgage Program, 27 NCLC REP. BANKR. &
FORECLOSURES EDITION 19, 19 (2009).
76 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 38).
77 See id. (manuscript at 37–38) (“PSAs give servicers of private-label RMBS a high degree of latitude in
how to calculate [NPV].”); see also Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 22 (observing restrictions in PSAs on what
types of loss mitigation options could be implemented but only restricting NPV calculations to the extent that
they must maximize the investors’ profits). But see Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 18 (noting that some
government-sponsored enterprises require servicers to use standardized software when calculating NPV).
78 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 38). “Investors rarely monitor these choices or question them.” Id.
79 See id.
80 See id. (manuscript at 41). For further reading on the incentives of mortgage servicers, see id.
(manuscript passim), which evaluates various factors on mortgage servicers’ decisions to implement loan
modifications for default loans. See also, e.g., Thompson, supra note 22 (examining servicer incentives that
make foreclosure more profitable than loan modifications); Cordell et al., supra note 37 (describing financial
factors that influence mortgage servicer decisions).
74

DEWAR GALLEYSPROOFS2

188

9/24/2013 12:11 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:175

These factors impact servicer decisions in favor of foreclosures and
unsustainable loss mitigation options, often against the best interest of
investors and borrowers.81 Servicers can spend less money and recoup more
costs by foreclosing rather than modifying.82 Despite the large losses that
servicers, investors, and borrowers may face in foreclosure, foreclosure is
frequently less expensive than loss mitigation for servicers because the process
is systematic and does not vary based on individual borrowers’
circumstances.83
When servicers find it in their best interest to proceed with loss mitigation,
servicers are incentivized to pursue options that forbear principal, capitalize
arrears, and add default fees.84 These options are most attractive to servicers as
they “pump up the unpaid balance of the loan pool” and have the lowest effect
on the servicer’s greatest source of income: the fixed monthly fee on the
unpaid principal balance.85 These options are ultimately ineffective because
without a counterbalancing payment reduction, such as reduced interest or an
extension of the term, the increased principal balance increases a borrower’s
mortgage payments.86 Implementing improper loss mitigation options
increases the likelihood that a borrower will redefault on her mortgage and lose
her home.87

81 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 35) (“There is good reason to believe that servicers sometimes
refuse to make loan modifications even when those modifications would minimize losses to investors relative
to foreclosure.”); Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 15. When a borrower becomes delinquent, the cheapest
option for servicers is to do nothing and allow borrowers the opportunity to self-cure. See Thompson, supra
note 22, at 824. Borrowers can borrow money from a friend, win the lottery, or fix a difficult situation (such as
getting a job when the cause for default was unemployment). Id. Historically, these odds are approximately
one in four. Id. Many servicers prefer to take those odds than incur the cost of loss mitigation or foreclosure.
Id.
82 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 771–72.
83 The foreclosure process is prescribed by statute and does not change for individual borrowers. See
Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 15–16. Servicers do not need to hire specially trained employees to process
foreclosures. On the other hand, employees in loss mitigation departments require special training and
significant time to determine the appropriate loss mitigation option for each borrower. See id. at 15–16, 23; see
also Thompson, supra note 22, at 821–23 (“Modifications are costly in terms of staff time and skill to
implement.”). For example, a servicer must calculate NPV estimates, verify data, and coordinate its actions
with the servicers for junior liens on the property. Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 15.
84 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 43); Thompson, supra note 22, at 772, 807–09, 818
(“Servicers can . . . make more money by making short-term unsustainable payment agreements than they can
by making long-term, sustainable modifications.”).
85 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 42).
86 See id. (manuscript at 32).
87 See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 23–24 (“A high recidivism rate directly impinges on the
profitability of a potential loan modification . . . [because it] increases the odds that the servicer will incur
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D. The Financial Crisis of 2007–2008
This section discusses the economic situation that was the impetus for the
Regulation X amendments. The large number of foreclosures during the
financial crisis of 2007–2008 set the stage for the Dodd-Frank Act and the
subsequent regulation of the mortgage servicing industry.88 The crisis was
caused by the collapse of the U.S. housing market that accompanied a larger
financial crisis on Wall Street and the worst economic panic since the Great
Depression.89
A housing bubble was created in the 1990s and early 2000s through the
growth of private-label securitization caused by the easy availability of
financing and banks’ willingness to issue a range of untraditional mortgage
products.90 Lenders were able to make increasingly risky mortgages through
excess liquidity, rising home prices, and an ineffectively regulated primary
mortgage market.91 Lenders were encouraged to make risky loans because they
were pooling and selling the loans as residential mortgage-backed securities on
the secondary mortgage market and were able to hedge their investments with
credit default swaps.92 Risky mortgages were often given to people at the
lowest end of lending standards because they did not have the financial
security to be approved for a traditional mortgage.93 Investors in securitizations
believed they were guaranteed recovery assuming that borrowers would either
default, in which case the lender could foreclose on the property, or that
housing prices would increase so borrowers would refinance, giving lenders
the opportunity to charge additional fees.94

labor costs of modification again . . . .”); see also Tad Friend, Home Economics, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 4,
2013, at 26, 27.
88 See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 1.
89 See REAVIS, supra note 4, at 3; Kennedy et al., supra note 43, at 1142; Bill Thomas et al., Opinion,
What Caused the Financial Crisis? WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052
748704698004576104500524998280.html.
90 See Thomas et al., supra note 89.
91 MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 47 (2010); Thomas et al., supra note 89.
92 See LEWIS, supra note 91, at 90–91.
93 See id. at 96–97. Some lenders even waived the requirement for borrowers to show proof of income
before approving a mortgage. Id. The Bureau has addressed the problem of lenders not checking borrower
income in its Ability-to-Repay rule, which institutes specific underwriting requirements. Ability-to-Repay and
Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 35,430, 35,430,
35,348 (June 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
94 LEWIS, supra note 91, at 169.
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In 2007 the housing bubble burst when borrowers were unable to pay their
mortgages.95 The wave of defaults was met with a wave of hasty foreclosures
because mortgage servicers were not prepared to handle the vast number of
simultaneous defaults. Mortgage loan delinquency rates almost doubled
between 2007 and 2009 for first-lien mortgage loans from 5.4% to 9.4%.96 The
increased number of foreclosures depressed housing prices.97 By 2012 housing
prices had fallen 33% from 2006, eliminating $7 trillion in homeowner equity
and preventing homeowners from being able to refinance or sell their homes to
pay off their mortgages.98
The financial crisis showed that the mortgage servicing industry lacked the
infrastructure to handle high volumes of delinquent mortgages. Mortgage
servicers pushed to foreclose on properties before evaluating borrowers for
loss mitigation options.99 Borrowers reported difficulties contacting servicers,
receiving incomplete information, and having their homes foreclosed on even
after they had entered into or agreed upon loss mitigation options.100 In January
2013, 1.47 million foreclosed homes were listed for sale and an additional 2.3
million foreclosed homes sat unlisted.101 In contrast, about 620,000 homes
were foreclosed on in 2004.102 When mortgage servicers did implement loss
mitigation options in 2007 and 2008, the majority of options increased
borrowers’ monthly payments rather than reducing them.103 This was a “recipe
for failure” for “cash-strapped borrowers.”104 The amendments to
Regulation X are intended to standardize servicer communication and loss
mitigation application procedures to prevent such a large number of
foreclosures and the loss of homeowner equity in the future.105

95

REAVIS, supra note 4, at 4.
Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed.
Reg. 10,696, 10,700 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
97 REAVIS, supra note 4, at 4.
98 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 6–7).
99 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. 57,200, 57,251 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
100 See id. at 57,200, 57,203–04, 57,261.
101 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 1).
102 Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7 tbl.1.
103 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 24). For example, one study showed that over 84% of loan
modifications involved capitalized arrears even though this increased the risk of redefault for underwater
borrowers. Id. (manuscript at 34, 62).
104 Id. (manuscript at 23–25).
105 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,696 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
96
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II. THE REGULATION X AMENDMENTS
This Part examines the Bureau’s enforcement and supervisory powers
compared to the power held by regulators of federal consumer protection laws
before the Dodd-Frank Act and surveys the requirements for mortgage services
from the Regulation X amendments. Understanding the Bureau’s enforcement
powers is essential to understanding how the Regulation X amendments will be
implemented. For example, the strength of the Bureau’s powers to implement
the recordkeeping requirements discussed in section B of this Part is key to
understanding the data-collection effect discussed in Part IV.
A. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 as a response to the financial
crisis failure in 2007–2008.106 The Dodd-Frank Act created the Bureau, which
exists as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve System.107
Congress consolidated regulatory and rulemaking authority in the Bureau, and
gave it strong enforcement powers to compel compliance with federal
consumer protection law.
1. Creating the Bureau
Government regulation of mortgage servicers before the Dodd-Frank Act
was almost nonexistent and the government programs were ineffective. The
George W. Bush and Obama Administrations attempted to coordinate private
industry efforts to modify distressed loans through voluntary incentive
programs.108 Unfortunately, the programs were unsuccessful at increasing loan
modifications. The success of the regulations depended on cooperation by

106

Kennedy et al., supra note 43, at 1142.
Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681, 701 (2011) (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. V 2012))).
Despite being part of the Federal Reserve System, the Bureau has considerable independence, and the Federal
Reserve Board does not have the authority to “stop, delay, or disapprove of a Bureau regulation.” CARPENTER,
supra note 8, at 11.
108 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 9–12). The most significant program was the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP), implemented in 2009, which offered subsidies to servicers because it assumed
that servicers only avoided performing loss mitigation options due to the impact to their income. Id.
(manuscript at 19, 25). HAMP was not found to be conclusively successful because 42% of borrowers have
failed to graduate to permanent loan modifications. Id. (manuscript at 34 n.105).
107
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servicers on unattractive terms and “servicers were unwilling to swallow large,
certain write-downs instead of gambling on [losses in] foreclosure.”109
Regulation of mortgage servicers before the Dodd-Frank Act did not
provide sufficient oversight of servicer behavior. As described in Part I.A,
RESPA focused on mandating disclosures.110 Additionally, rulemaking and
enforcement authority over federal consumer protection law was spread
between seven federal agencies: five banking regulators, the Federal Trade
Commission, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.111 The
Federal Reserve Board held rulemaking powers, and enforcement authority
was diffused among the bank regulators, FTC, and HUD.112 Although the
banking regulators had strong supervisory powers over depository institutions,
such as banks, nondepository institutions and mortgage servicers were subject
to limited, if any, supervision.113
Congress created the Bureau to be the primary regulator of entities
providing consumer financial products and services.114 The Dodd-Frank Act
consolidates power in the Bureau from the seven agencies previously charged
with supervising federal consumer protection law.115 The consolidation is a
grant of new authority, not a transfer of power from the existing agencies.116
The federal agencies retain regulatory power over federal consumer protection
law and are expected to act in conjunction with the Bureau on enforcement
actions.117 An agency may recommend and, if the Bureau fails to take action,
109 Id. (manuscript at 11); see also Thompson, supra note 22, at 829. (“As long as servicers can choose
not to perform modification, they will, by and large, choose the path of least resistance—foreclosures and
temporary modifications that strip wealth from both investors and homeowners.”).
110 See supra Part I.A; see also Kennedy et al., supra note 43, at 1148.
111 CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 2. The five banking regulators included the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. Id.
112 Id. at 4.
113 See id. at 2–4. For example, the FTC had limited supervisory authority and could not institute
reporting requirements on nondepository institutions. Id. at 3. The FTC could only regularly examine these
institutions with “ex post enforcement,” leaving them fairly unchecked. Id.
114 See id. at 9; John D. Wright, Dodd-Frank’s “Abusive” Standard: A Call for Certainty, 8 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J., no. 2, 2011, at 164, 165. Entities providing consumer financial product services include nonbank
entities such as “mortgage originators, brokers, and servicers; private student lenders; [and] payday lenders.”
Kennedy et al., supra note 43, at 1146–47.
115 See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 2, 4, 9; Michael T. Escue, First CFPB Public Enforcement Action
Offers Insight into Agency Expectations, 248 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 2012, at 3.
116 See Escue, supra note 115.
117 See, e.g., id. (describing CFPB’s enforcement action against Capital One Bank for $160 million “taken
in coordination with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1015, 12 U.S.C. § 5495 (Supp. V 2012).
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initiate its own enforcement action for violations of federal consumer
protection law.118 The consolidation of authority in the Bureau ensures that a
single federal agency has adequate authority to efficiently and consistently
enforce federal regulation over all industry entities.
2. The Bureau’s Powers
The Bureau has primary rulemaking authority over many federal consumer
protection laws, including RESPA.119 The Dodd-Frank Act outlines specific
rules the Bureau should enact and endows the Bureau with broad rulemaking
power to “prescribe rules . . . as may be necessary . . . to enable to Bureau to
administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer
laws.”120 Beyond the broad grant of rulemaking power, the Dodd-Frank Act is
relatively silent about the “substantive breadth of the Bureau’s rulemaking
authority.”121
The Bureau has stronger enforcement powers than any single federal
agency regulating consumer financial services before the Dodd-Frank Act.
Important for the Regulation X amendments is the Bureau’s ability to
implement recordkeeping requirements on supervised entities.122 The Bureau’s
enforcement powers include the ability to demand the production of any
documentary material or tangible things, require sworn testimony, file written
reports, conduct hearings and adjudication proceedings, litigate civil actions,
issue temporary cease and desist orders, and refer criminal matters to the
Department of Justice.123
Additionally, the Bureau has the power to implement significant relief
measures for violations of federal consumer protection laws. Relief may

118

CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 3
(2011), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFPB-Accountability-fact-sheet-6-11.pdf.
119 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5512(b)(4)(a), 5581(b)(7); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 1. Although the Bureau has
acquired primary rulemaking authority over most federal consumer protection laws, it does not have authority
over all federal consumer laws. For example, HUD is the primary rulemaking authority under the Fair Housing
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2006).
120 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1).
121 Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 107, at 705. Some practitioners and academics have expressed
concern for the seeming lack of oversight of the Bureau’s regulations. See Wright, supra note 114, at 165.
122 See 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(7)(B).
123 See id. §§ 5562–5564, 5566; see also Laureen E. Galeoto et al., The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau: The New Sheriff in Town, 129 BANKING L.J. 702, 706 (2012); KING & SPALDING, CLIENT ALERT:
CFPB PROPOSES CHANGES TO REGULATIONS Z AND X (2012), available at http://www.kslaw.com/
imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca081312b.pdf.
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include rescission of contracts, refund of money, return of property, restitution,
public notice of the violation, and limits on what functions an entity can
perform.124 The monetary penalties are steep and range from $5,000 to
$1 million per day for every day an entity violates a federal consumer
protection law.125
B. Amendments to Regulation X
The Bureau proposed nine amendments to Regulation X on August 9,
2012, under notice and comment rulemaking.126 The rule was finalized on
January 17, 2013, with an effective date of January 10, 2014.127 The
amendments change nine areas of mortgage servicing with the intent of
creating greater accountability and transparency for consumers.128 Four of the
amendments are promulgated under the Bureau’s broad rulemaking power.129
These four amendments are the most important for purposes of this Comment’s
analysis.
Alongside creating transparency and accountability, the amendments to
Regulation X aim to consolidate existing federal requirements for mortgage

124

See 12 U.S.C. § 5565.
See id. § 5565(c)(2); see also Galeoto et al., supra note 123, at 706.
126 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. 57,200, 57,200–02 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); Diana Olick, Big
Banks Pushed to Outsource Mortgages, CNBC (Aug. 13, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48648395.
The amendments apply to “[f]ederal related mortgage loans,” which include any loan secured by a first or
subordinate lien on residential property and installment land contracts, with a few exceptions. See Mortgage
Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10,696,
10,873–74 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.2(b)). The regulation generally excludes open
lines of credit, business-purpose loans, and temporary loans, such as construction loans. See id. at 10,698.
“Open-end lines of credit ([HELOCs]) are generally exempt from” Regulation X’s requirements, though they
are regulated under Regulation Z, the enacting regulation for the Truth in Lending Act. Id. at 10,698, 10,721.
The Bureau exempted HELOCs from Regulation X because HELOCs are more similar to open-end consumer
products, such as credit cards, and have different servicing risks from closed-end mortgage loans. Id. at
10,721.
127 Id. at 10,696, 10,708.
128 See id. at 10,696; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PUTTING THE ‘SERVICE’ BACK IN MORTGAGE
SERVICING: NO SURPRISES, NO RUNAROUNDS (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201208_
cfpb_mortgage_servicing_fact_sheet.pdf; see also Cordray, supra note 9 (noting that the rules are intended to
provide a fairer process for borrowers at risk of losing their homes).
129 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5512(b)(1); 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage
Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. Reg. at 57,206. The four amendments promulgated under the broad rulemaking
power are (1) general servicing policies, procedures, and requirements; (2) early intervention with delinquent
borrowers; (3) continuity of contact with delinquent borrowers; and (4) loss mitigation procedures. Mortgage
Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10,696.
125
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servicers.130 Under the preexisting terms of RESPA, servicers must meet
specific requirements for various types of loans and the corresponding entities
that sponsor those loans.131 These include servicing guidelines for governmentsponsored enterprises, government insured program guidelines, contractual
agreements with investors and trustees for private-label loans, and bank- or
institution-specific policies.132 Along with consolidating these existing
requirements, the amendments also incorporate some of the mortgage servicing
requirements that were part of the National Mortgage Settlement.133 These
requirements will persist alongside Regulation X and the amendments are not
intended to preempt these restraints.134 The Bureau’s incorporation and
consideration of existing restrictions into Regulation X’s framework is
intended to create a more efficient set of requirements applicable to all
mortgage servicers.
The four amendments promulgated under the Bureau’s broad rulemaking
power have three aims: (1) requiring servicers to keep records of borrower
information and communication, (2) facilitating and recording communication
between the borrower and the servicer, and (3) establishing uniform loss
mitigation application review procedures.135 The Bureau anticipates that the
transparency and accountability from these requirements will help borrowers
avoid unnecessary foreclosures.136 This Comment argues in Part IV that the
immediate effects of these amendments are the creation of uniform industry
standards and collection of data on servicer behavior. This Comment also
130 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 57,209.
131 Id. at 57,204–05.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 57,205. See generally PHILIP A. LEHMAN, NAT’L MORTG. SETTLEMENT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OF MULTISTATE/FEDERAL SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS (2012), available at https://
d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/NMS_Executive_Summary-7-23-2012.pdf (explaining the background, terms,
and resulting payments of the National Mortgage Settlement). The Settlement was a joint action by state
attorneys general and various federal agencies, including HUD, against the five leading bank mortgage
servicers for their loan-servicing practices and foreclosure processes, especially robo-signing affidavits. Id. at
1. The five bank mortgage servicers were Bank of America Corp., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo &
Co., Citigroup Inc., and Ally Financial Inc. See NAT’L MORTG. SETTLEMENT, FACT SHEET: MORTGAGE
SERVICING SETTLEMENT 2 (2012), available at https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Mortgage_Servicing_
Settlement_Fact_Sheet.pdf. The Settlement resulted in $25 billion in monetary sanctions and relief, as well as
comprehensive changes to mortgage loan-servicing requirements. See id. The Settlement is not federal law and
has no federal significance beyond the parallel promulgation by the Bureau.
134 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 57,205.
135 See id. at 57,205, 57,209–10.
136 See 5id. at 57,209–10, 57,274.
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asserts that the amendments leave gaps—such as a flexible NPV
requirement—that leave borrowers exposed to improper loss mitigation
options.
1. Recordkeeping Requirements
The first amendment establishes general servicing procedures aimed at
implementing recordkeeping requirements.137 The required policies should
facilitate compliance with the communication requirements and the loss
mitigation procedures in the other amendments.138 The records and procedures
in this amendment are subject to supervision by the Bureau and federal
regulators.139 Under the first amendment, the servicer must keep a servicing
file for each mortgage loan account while the servicer is actively servicing the
loan.140 The servicing file must contain specific documents, including a copy
of the security instrument and copies of information provided for loss
mitigation applications.141 Servicers are obligated to keep this file and
documentation of their actions with respect to a borrower’s loan account for at
least one year after the mortgage is either discharged or transferred.142
Requiring servicers to have copies of accurate information aims to avoid some
of the confusion between servicers and borrowers that contributed to the
unnecessary foreclosures during the financial crisis.143
2. Facilitating and Recording Servicer–Borrower Communication
The Bureau requires servicers to implement early contact, single point of
contact, and information access procedures under the first, second, and third
amendments.144 These requirements create a record of servicer–borrower
communication. Servicer procedures implemented under this section are

137 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,882–83 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38).
138 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 57,248, 57,280, 57,304.
139 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,697–98.
140 Id. at 10,883 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(c)).
141 See id.
142 Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(c)(1)).
143 See supra Part I.D (discussing how servicer behavior exacerbated the wave of foreclosures resulting
from the financial crisis of 2007–2008).
144 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,882–84 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38–.40).
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subject to supervision by the Bureau and regulators, but borrowers do not have
a private right of action for enforcement.145
The second amendment requires all servicers to initiate early contact with
delinquent borrowers or a borrower’s agent.146 The amendment has two
communication components: an oral notice of delinquency and a written notice
with information.147 When giving the oral notice,148 the servicer must notify
the borrower that the payment is late or missing and, if applicable, that loss
mitigation options are available.149 The initial conversation about a borrower’s
delinquency will allow a servicer to begin to identify appropriate loss
mitigation options.150 The written notice151 must include specific information,
including a statement encouraging the borrower to contact the servicer, and a
statement of loss mitigation options that may be available.152 Written notice
provides the borrower with consistent information and a reference to detailed
information that can be taken to a third-party advisor, such as a housing
counselor.153
The third amendment implements staffing procedures that assign staff
members to delinquent borrowers contacted via written notice under the
second amendment.154 The servicer has the discretion to assign a single person
or a team of personnel to a borrower.155 Personnel assigned to delinquent
145

See id. at 10,698.
See id. at 10,895 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(a) cmt. 4).
147 See id. at 10,883 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(a)–(b)).
148 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(a)). Oral notice must be given over the phone or in
person no later than thirty-six days after a missed payment date. Id. Oral servicer–borrower contact must be
done over the phone or in person, but cannot be made with a phone-delivered recording. See id.
149 See id. Notification of loss mitigation options is applicable, for example, where the servicer learns of a
change in the borrower’s financial circumstances. See id. at 10,894–95 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 1024.39(a) cmt. 3(i)(A)).
150 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. 57,200, 57,252 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
151 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,883 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(b)). The written notice must be sent to a borrower
that is still delinquent no later than the forty-five days after the missed payment (ten days after the thirty-sixday oral communication period has expired). Id.
152 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(b)(2)).
153 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 57,255.
154 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,883–84 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(a)(1)). A comment to the amendment broadens
a servicer’s responsibility to the “borrower” to include an agent authorized to act on the borrower’s behalf,
such as a housing counselor or attorney. See id. at 10,895–96 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(a) cmt. 1).
155 See id. at 10,896 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(a) cmt. 2).
146
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borrowers are responsible for answering borrower inquiries and helping
borrowers navigate loss mitigation options.156
Under the third amendment, the assigned personnel must be able to access
a complete record of the borrower’s payment history and all written
information the borrower has provided to the servicer or prior servicers as part
of a loss mitigation application, filed in accordance with the first
amendment.157 This access enables the personnel to perform a designated list
of functions that provide borrowers with information about loss mitigation
options, loss mitigation applications, and foreclosures.158 Similarly, the first
amendment requires servicers to maintain policies that provide the servicing
parties with accurate information, including timely and accurate responses to
borrower inquiries and proper loss mitigation application evaluation.159 The
objectives are considered achieved when a servicer retains and has easy access
to “accurate and current” documents reflecting servicer action and borrower
information.160
The Bureau anticipates that early outreach to borrowers and an assigned
point of contact within the servicer will help borrowers avoid foreclosure.161
Oral and written contact at an early stage of delinquency notifies the borrower
of her options, giving her an opportunity to either self-correct a mistake,
consider and apply for loss mitigation options in accordance with the fourth
amendment requirements, or prepare for the foreclosure process.162 Assigning
personnel to a delinquent borrower gives the borrower a certain point for
communicating with the servicer and makes someone within the servicer
personally accountable to the individual. The Bureau believes that borrower
delinquencies will be solved more efficiently if personnel have access to
156 See id. at 10,883–84 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(a)(2)). A servicer must assign personnel to
delinquent borrowers by the time provided for written notice (no later than the forty-fifth day of delinquency).
See id. at 10,884. Servicer personnel must be available via telephone to give live responses or the servicer
should have procedures that ensure a live response in a “timely manner.” Id. The assigned personnel remain
available to the borrower until the borrower has made two consecutive mortgage payments in accordance with
the terms of a permanent loss mitigation agreement. See id.
157 See id. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(b)(2)).
158 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(b)).
159 See id. at 10,882–83 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(b)(1)–(2)).
160 See id. at 10,882, 10,893 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(b)(1)(iv) cmt. 1). For example, the
servicer’s policies should show how a servicer identifies the loss mitigation options that are available to
various borrowers and its threshold for borrower eligibility. See id. at 10,893 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 1024.38(b)(2)(ii) cmt. 1).
161 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. 57,200, 57,261 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
162 See id. at 57,251.
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borrower information.163 Coupled with the recordkeeping requirements in the
first amendment, the communication procedures in the second and third
amendment may avoid the mishandling of borrower’s loss mitigation
applications caused by servicers’ improper infrastructure and unaccountable
personnel during the financial crisis.164
3. Loss Mitigation Procedures
The fourth amendment provides a uniform set of procedures for processing
loss mitigation applications.165 The amendment establishes a timeline intended
to prevent hasty foreclosures, provide borrowers and servicers with sufficient
time to apply for and review loss mitigation options, and limit the dual-track
system.166 The requirements in this amendment are intended to work in
conjunction with the early borrower contact and continuity-of-contact
requirements to avoid burdening servicers.167 Individual borrowers can enforce
the loss mitigation provisions in the fourth amendment through private action
under RESPA. 168
The amendment limits servicer foreclosure action. Servicers are prohibited
from issuing a notice or filing required for any judicial or nonjudicial
foreclosure process until the borrower has been delinquent for 120 days.169
This 120-day “buffer” is in place for all borrowers, regardless of whether they
submit a loss mitigation application.170 Additionally, servicers cannot move for
a foreclosure judgment or order of sale, or conduct a foreclosure sale if a
borrower submits a complete loss mitigation application after the first
foreclosure notice or filing but more than thirty-seven days before a
foreclosure sale.171 The servicer cannot continue with or complete the
foreclosure process unless one of three events has occurred: (1) the servicer
163

See id. at 57,261.
See id.
165 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,884–85 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41).
166 See id.; 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77
Fed. Reg. at 57,266–67.
167 See id. at 57,267.
168 See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) (2006); Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)).
169 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1)).
170 See Gordon, supra note 49.
171 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(g)).
164
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sends the borrower a notice that the borrower is ineligible for all loss
mitigation options and an appeal is not available, not requested, or denied,
(2) the borrower rejects the servicer’s loss mitigation option, or (3) the
borrower fails to perform under a loss mitigation option agreement.172
The amendment establishes steps for the review and evaluation of
completed loss mitigation applications.173 A servicer must evaluate a borrower
for all options for which the borrower may be qualified⎯both workout and
liquidation options.174 However, servicers control the eligibility criteria for loss
mitigation options.175 Additionally, “[s]ervicers are free to follow ‘waterfalls’
established by an investor to determine eligibility for particular loss mitigation
options.”176 The borrower has the right under the fourth amendment to receive
written notice and participate in the appeals process for the denial of any “trial
or permanent loan modification option available to the borrower.”177 The
written notice must include “the specific reasons” for the servicer’s
determination, the borrower’s right to appeal,178 and any inputs used to make
an NPV calculation to the extent such inputs were the basis for the denial.179
The amendment neither mandates the outcome of loss mitigation evaluations

172 Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(2), (g)). In these instances, the servicer has the
responsibility to inform counsel not to proceed with the foreclosure. See id. at 10,698.
173 See id. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)). The Bureau defines a “loss mitigation
application” as an oral or written request for a loss mitigation option (defined as an alternative to foreclosure)
accompanied by information required by a servicer. Id. at 10,876 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.31). A
complete application is an application that includes “all the information the servicer regularly obtains and
considers” for evaluating loss mitigation options. 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X)
Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. Reg. 57,200, 57,268 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1024). The Bureau makes it clear that a servicer “shall not evade the requirement[s]” of Section
1024.41 because the application is incomplete and shall use “reasonable diligence” to complete the
application. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(c)(2)(i)–(ii)). These procedures only apply to
mortgage loans securing a borrower’s principal residence. See id. at 10,698.
174 See id. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(c)(1)(i)). See generally supra Part I.B.
175 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,827.
176 Id. at 10,698. A “waterfall” is an evaluation rule that prioritizes loss mitigation options. Id. at 10,827.
For example, if loss mitigation options are ranked one through six and a borrower is eligible for an option
higher on the list, then he is deemed denied for the lower options. Id.
177 See id. at 10,885 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d)(1), (h)(1)). The right to appeal the denial of
a trial or permanent loan modification option is only available to borrowers whose competed loss mitigation
application were received at least ninety days before a scheduled foreclosure sale. See id. (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 1024.41(h)(1)).
178 Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d)).
179 See id. at 10,897 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d)(1) cmt. 2).
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nor imposes a duty on servicers to provide any borrower with loss mitigation
options.180
III. AGENCY RULEMAKING UNDER THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE
The Regulation X amendments are demonstrations of the Bureau’s
interpretation of its authority to create and enforce rules for consumer
protection under RESPA.181 The promulgation of the amendments under the
Bureau’s broad rulemaking power raises the question of whether the issuance
of these rules is permissible.182 This Comment concludes that requiring
recordkeeping systems, policies for contact with delinquent borrowers, and
loss mitigation evaluation procedures are an authorized exercise of the
Bureau’s broad rulemaking power.
For an agency regulation to be valid, the regulation must be consistent with
the congressional statute under which the agency was given rulemaking
authority.183 An attack on a regulation’s validity can be aimed at the substance
of the rule or at how the rule was promulgated procedurally. Both attacks
require an analysis of the agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers
under the Chevron doctrine, a two-step test used by courts to determine
whether a court should grant deference to an agency’s interpretation of a
statute.184 Under Chevron, an agency regulation will be binding unless a court
finds that the regulation is “procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”185
180

See id. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)(1)).
See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(E) (Supp. V 2012); Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10,703.
182 Cf. Wright, supra note 114, at 164–66.
183 Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840–41 (1984) (interpreting
the Clean Air amendments which were implemented by the EPA); Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A., 317 F.3d 832,
834–35 (8th Cir. 2003) (interpreting RESPA, which HUD had implemented); Bank of Am., N.A. v. F.D.I.C.,
244 F.3d 1309, 1311, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act that the FDIC was charged with overseeing) (“An administrative agency should attempt to
conduct its actions . . . within the statutory limits that Congress has placed on its authority.”); Fed. Land Bank
of Springfield v. Farm Credit Admin., 676 F. Supp. 1239, 1241–42 (D. Mass. 1987) (interpreting the Farm
Credit Act which authorized the Farm Credit Administration to promulgated rules).
184 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)
(“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”); Evan J.
Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1272, 1276–77 (2008) (“[W]here agency decisionmaking processes satisfy all of the leading rationales for deference, the Court applies Chevron.”).
185 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
181
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The first step in Chevron is to determine whether Congress has directly
spoken to an issue.186 Congress has directly spoken to an issue when
Congress’s intent is clear and unambiguous.187 If Congress’s intent is clear and
unambiguous, the inquiry ends and the agency interpretation is given deference
only to the extent that it enacts the unambiguous congressional intent.188 A
court may use traditional tools of statutory interpretation to determine
congressional intent under step one.189 A court will reject an agency’s
interpretation of a statute that conflicts with congressional intent190 or the plain
language of a statute.191
If Congress has not directly spoken to the issue, then the court will ask if
the agency’s regulation is “based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”192 Courts will uphold an agency regulation as a permissible
construction of the statute so long as the regulation is “sufficiently rational”193
and is not “arbitrary [and] capricious.”194 Courts rarely strike down an agency
action under the second step.195 Deference to an agency’s interpretation is
especially appropriate when the implementing agency is interpreting a new
statute196 or the implementing agency has primary responsibility for the
underlying matter.197 Additionally, courts look for an “express delegation of
authority” to an agency to fill a statutory gap.198 This Comment argues that the
186

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 843 n.9.
190 Grunbeck v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., FSB, 74 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 843 n.9).
191 Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A., 317 F.3d 832, 835–36 (8th Cir. 2003); Fed. Land Bank of Springfield v.
Farm Credit Admin., 676 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (D. Mass. 1987) (denying agency deference for issuing a
regulation that went against specific criteria).
192 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
193 Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985). See Home Mortg.
Bank v. Ryan, 986 F.2d 372, 376 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844)).
194 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
195 Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation,
and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 775 (2008).
196 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also Cooper Dev.
Co., v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 762 F. Supp. 1145, 1151–52 (D.N.J. 1991) (citing Atl. Richfield Co. v. U.S.
Dept. of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
197 Home Mortg. Bank, 986 F.2d at 376 (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125).
198 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 865–66; Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 961 (8th Cir.
2002) (finding Congress did expressly delegate authority to HUD when it authorized HUD to prescribe rules
necessary to achieve the purposes of RESPA); see also Criddle, supra note 184, at 1275 (grounding the
Supreme Court’s Chevron analysis in five factors, including the agency as the delegated authority and agency
expertise).
187
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Regulation X amendments are substantively and procedurally valid under
Chevron’s second step.
A. Substantive Validity
An agency regulation’s substantive validity depends on whether the agency
has properly interpreted the authority granted to it by Congress. The Bureau
relies on three sections of RESPA, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, as its
legal authority for promulgating the amendments to Regulation X.199 One
provision of RESPA provides, “A servicer of a federally related mortgage shall
not . . . fail to comply with any other obligation found by the Bureau . . . to be
appropriate to carry out the consumer protection purposes of this chapter.”200
The other two provisions permit the Bureau to “establish any requirements”201
and “prescribe such rules and regulations”202 necessary to achieve RESPA’s
purpose.
The amendments will be upheld under the first step of Chevron if RESPA’s
language shows Congress’s clear and unambiguous intent. However, the
amendments do not warrant agency deference under the first step of Chevron
because neither RESPA’s plain language nor statutory context reveals
Congress’s clear and unambiguous intent. RESPA instructs the Bureau to
promulgate any rules or regulations that are necessary to carry out the statute’s
consumer protection purpose.203 Typically, courts have found that broad
language does not have the “precision necessary” to determine congressional
intent under the first step of Chevron.204 Success under step one depends on
whether the language in a statute “compel[s] any given interpretation.”205

199

See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(j)(3), (k)(1)(E), 2617(a) (Supp. V 2012).
Id. § 2605(k)(1)(E).
201 Id. § 2605(j)(3).
202 Id. § 2617(a).
203 Id. §§ 2605(j)(3), (k)(1)(E), 2617(a).
204 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 708, 711 (2011)
(citing United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 305 (2009)) (interpreting the word “student” and
ultimately deferring to the Treasury Department’s interpretation of FICA under the second step of Chevron
and engaging in a multifactor analysis for the first Chevron step that is unique to review of tax regulation). See
also Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (finding that there was necessarily ambiguity
in the term “visitorial powers”); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125–26
(1985) (finding no plain meaning for “modify” where it could be interpreted both broadly and narrowly).
205 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 860 (1984). “We are not
persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress.” Id. at
861.
200
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Courts are permitted to use traditional tools of statutory interpretation
under step one to examine whether Congress has expressed its clear intent,
including examining the statute as a whole. The remaining statutory text does
not illuminate an unambiguous meaning of “any . . . obligation . . . to be
appropriate to carry out the consumer protection purposes of this chapter.”206
For example, RESPA’s stated purpose is to provide effective disclosures,
eliminate referral fees, reduce the amount homeowner’s put into escrow, and
modernize local land title recordkeeping.207 RESPA’s text as a whole does not
address whether Congress intended for the Bureau to implement regulations
about loss mitigation application procedures or contact with delinquent
borrowers.208
The analysis moves to the second step of Chevron. Notably, deference to an
agency’s interpretation under the second step is escalated when the case
involves construction “of a new statute by its implementing agency”209 or
where the agency has primary responsibility for the underlying matter.210 For
example, in Home Mortgage Bank v. Ryan, the Tenth Circuit noted that the
Office of Thrift Supervisors’ interpretation of a new loan regulation was
subject to “considerable deference” since the agency had the primary
responsibility for regulating savings and loans.211 Congress delegated primary
rulemaking authority over federal consumer financial protection laws, and
specifically over RESPA, to the Bureau.212 A reviewing court would give the
Bureau deference based on that delegation, as in Home Mortgage Bank.213
Broad deference under the second step of Chevron is especially appropriate
where courts find that Congress has intentionally left a statutory gap for an

206

12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(E).
See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b).
208 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 861–62.
209 Atl. Richfield Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 789–90 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (showing heightened deference to agency
interpretations of new statutes even before Chevron). Although RESPA is not a “new” statute, it has
undergone significant changes under the Dodd-Frank Act. See e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006), amended by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1463, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k) (Supp. V 2012).
210 Home Mortg. Bank v. Ryan, 986 F.2d 372, 376 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985)).
211 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
212 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (Supp. V
2012).
213 See Home Mortg. Bank, 986 F.2d at 376–77 (granting deference to the Office of Thrift Supervisors’
interpretation based on the OTS’s primary authority over savings associations).
207
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agency with superior industry-specific expertise to fill.214 So long as an
agency’s interpretation “fills a gap or defines a term” in a statute reasonably
and is not in conflict with the statute’s text, then a court will give deference to
the agency’s interpretation.215 RESPA instructs the Bureau to carry out “any”
requirements necessary to achieve the consumer purposes of RESPA, which
demonstrates an explicit gap.216 The Bureau has industry-specific knowledge,
demonstrated by the economic and financial expertise it acquired upon hiring
key economic and political experts and from the extensive consumer and
market research it has accumulated since its inception.217 The Bureau has
chosen to fill the gap with regulations over mortgage servicers requiring
communication and loss mitigation procedures. Additionally, the Bureau’s
amendments requiring early contact, continual contact, and loss mitigation
procedures do not conflict with the plain meaning of “any regulation”
appropriate to carry out consumer protection purposes.218

214 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 158–59 (2007) (considering the agency’s
expertise and knowledge in regulated area in awarding agency deference); Chevron U.S.A. V. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (describing the separation of expertise between judges and
agencies with regard to statutory interpretation); Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 61 (2d
Cir. 2004) (considering HUD’s “expertise regarding the market for federally related home mortgage loans” in
awarding Chevron deference to a HUD regulation).
215 Kruse, 383 F.3d at 55 (citing Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 457 (1998)); see, e.g., Fla.
Manufactured Hous. Ass’n, v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995) (deferring to HUD’s
interpretation of the Manufactured Housing Act where the statute required HUD to consider certain factors,
but with no precise indication how, and HUD’s interpretation furthered the Manufactured Housing Act’s
purpose).
216 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(j)(3), 2617(a) (Supp. V 2012); see, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996–97 (2005) (finding an explicit gap in the Communications Act for the
Federal Communications Commission to define “telecommunications-service offerors” where the statute’s
definitions made no distinctions between various interpretations); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 865–66 (deciding
Congress left a gap in the Clean Air Act for the EPA to define “stationary source”); see also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (noting that a “very good indicator” of “Chevron treatment is express
congressional authorizations to engage in the rulemaking . . . process that produces the regulations . . . for
which deference is claimed”).
217 For example, the Bureau’s director, Richard Cordray, is the former Ohio Attorney General, who
recently replaced Elizabeth Warren, a bankruptcy law professor at Harvard. See Adam Sorensen, Obama
Passes Over Warren, Names Deputy to Run Consumer Agency, TIME (July 17, 2011), http://swampland.time.
com/2011/07/17/obama-picks-former-ohio-ag-warren-deputy-to-head-consumer-bureau/; About Rich Cordray,
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/about-richcordray/ (last visited Aug 16, 2013).
218 Cf. Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A. 317 F.3d 832, 835–36, 838–40 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that HUD’s
interpretation of RESPA went beyond RESPA’s plain meaning although the case was remanded).
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Courts consider factors other than an agency’s expertise at Chevron’s
second step to determine if an agency’s interpretation is reasonable.219 For
example, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Cisneros, the Sixth
Circuit upheld a HUD interpretation of broad language in the Fair Housing Act
because HUD’s regulation was directly connected to the Fair Housing Act’s
purpose to ensure borrowers have access to affordable housing.220 RESPA, as
amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, is focused on protecting consumers from
harmful actions by mortgage servicers and establishing mortgage servicers’
duties to borrowers.221 It is no less reasonable that the Bureau’s regulations of
early borrower contact, continuity of contact, and uniform loss mitigation
procedures are directly connected to RESPA’s aim to promote consumer
protection in mortgage transactions.222
The Bureau’s interpretation of “any regulation necessary” as servicing and
loss mitigation procedures, recordkeeping requirements, and delinquentborrower contact policies should be given deference under the second step of
Chevron. Aside from the implicit broad deference under Chevron’s second
step, the Bureau has used its industry expertise to fill in specific gaps in an
industry where it is the primary regulator. Additionally, the amendments
further the consumer protection purposes of RESPA, making them worthy of a
court’s deference.
B. Procedural Validity
Procedurally an agency rule is valid if it meets the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)223 and any additional requirements
expressly stated in the granting statute.224 The Dodd-Frank Act requires Bureau
219 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1864 (2013) (stating that the ultimate question under
Chevron is, “simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority”); see also
NSK Ltd v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d. 1291, 1296–97 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002) (providing a nonexclusive
list of factors a court may use during the second-step, including “the express terms of the provisions at issue,
the objectives of those provisions and the objectives of the . . . scheme as a whole”).
220 52 F.3d 1351, 1359 (6th Cir. 1995) (deciding regulating property insurance was directly connected to
the ability to purchase a home).
221 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,709 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
222 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1400(c), 1463(a), 12 U.S.C.
§ 2605(k)(1)(E) (Supp. V 2012).
223 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see also id. § 551(a) (defining “agency” and bringing the Bureau under the
APA); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 20.
224 Cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005). See
generally CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:30 (3d ed. 2013) (describing the
relationship between the APA and specific enabling acts).
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rules to be issued under notice and comment rulemaking and includes three
additional requirements for new consumer protection rules: (1) considering the
potential benefits and costs to consumers, (2) consulting with the appropriate
agencies, and (3) responding to written objections from prudential regulators in
the final rule.225 The Chevron doctrine must be applied to determine whether
the Bureau properly interpreted these requirements when promulgating the
amendments to ensure their procedural validity. The Bureau has satisfied the
procedural requirements so long as its interpretation of the rulemaking
requirements from the Dodd-Frank Act are “based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”226
First, the Bureau must evaluate “the potential benefits and costs to
consumers.”227 The Bureau asserts in the final rule that it considered potential
benefits, costs, and impacts.228The Bureau evaluated the potential benefits and
costs of the amendments to Regulation X to satisfy the first requirement by
using market data, reports, figures, and other pieces of information to evaluate
the costs and benefits and comparing the potential impact of the amendments
against a “pre-statutory baseline.”229
Information used in cost and benefit analysis is permitted so long as its use
is not arbitrary and capricious.230 The information used is not arbitrary and
capricious if the agency gives a logical explanation for the cost and benefit
information it relies upon in promulgating a new rule.231 The Bureau offers an
explanation for all of the data sources it used to analyze the costs and benefits
for each of the broad rule amendments. For example, when writing the
requirements for early contact with delinquent borrowers, the Bureau
considered a Freddie Mac paper to understand how timing affects borrowers’

225 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b) (outlining requirements beyond the APA that the Bureau must fulfill when
promulgating new rules); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 20. There are also specific requirements for the Bureau
when the Bureau promulgates particular rules, such as declaring certain acts unfair and abusive. See
CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 22–23.
226 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
227 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A).
228 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,844 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
229 Id. at 10,845. Because the four amendments were not imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act, the pre-statute
and post-statute baseline are the same. Id.
230 See Fla. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n, Inc. v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).
231 See id. at 1580 (finding that HUD’s reliance on data created by its own engineers was not arbitrary and
capricious).
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responses to servicer outreach.232 The paper compares redefault rates for
repayment plans established when borrowers were thirty days late on payments
with borrowers who were sixty days late, and was used to determine the best
time to contact delinquent borrowers.233 Additionally the Bureau examined a
study of complaints to the HOPE Hotline when writing the continuity-ofcontact procedures.234 The study shows that over half of the complaints
concerned lost documentation and an inability to reach servicers to obtain
information about their Home Affordable Modification Program
modifications.235 This study was used to show the benefits of assigning a point
of contact within a servicer.236 The Bureau’s interpretation of the Dodd-Frank
Act’s first rulemaking requirement is not arbitrary and capricious because the
Bureau offers a logical explanation for using various data and reports to study
the potential costs and benefits to consumers under each of the amendments.237
Second, before proposing a rule and during the comment period, the
Bureau must consult with the “appropriate” regulators and financial
agencies.238 In promulgating these amendments, the Bureau has consulted, or
offered to consult, with the prudential regulators,239 HUD, FHFA, the FTC,
232 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,856 (citing Amy Crews Cutts & William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default:
Policies and Practices to Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs, at tbl.2 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 0801, 2008)).
233 See id. at 10,856; see also id. at 10,855.
234 See id. at 10,857.
235 See id. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was implemented in 2009 and offers
subsidies to servicers to provide affordable loan modifications to eligible borrowers. See McCoy, supra note 6
(manuscript at 19, 21). See generally About HMPadmin.com, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM,
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/resources/overview.jsp (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (describing the
assistance services offered by HAMP).
236 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed.
Reg. at 10,856–57 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: FURTHER
ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY AND EQUITABLY IMPLEMENT FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 15 (2010)).
The HOPE Hotline is a twenty-four-hour telephone line that provides borrowers with free counseling and
foreclosure information from HUD-certified housing counselors. See About the Homeowner’s HOPE Hotline,
HOPE NOW, http://www.hopenow.com/hotline-aboutus.php (last visited Aug 16, 2013). The Hotline is run by
the Homeownership Preservation Foundation, a nonprofit organization focused on helping homeowners avoid
foreclosure. See id.
237 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Fla.
Manufactured Hous. Ass’n, v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1580 (11th Cir. 1995).
238 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(B)
(Supp. V 2012); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 20.
239 The “prudential regulators” are collectively the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National
Credit Union Association. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
and Prudential Regulators Issue Joint Guidance to Address Mortgage Servicer Practices that Impact
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and FEMA.240 The Bureau also “held discussions with and solicited feedback”
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Housing Service, the FHA, the
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), and the
Department of Veterans Affairs regarding the potential impacts of the final rule
on mortgage loan insurance or securitization programs.241
Each consulted agency has an integral role in federal consumer financial
protection. Either it is or was formally responsible for one of three duties:
(1) promulgating and enforcing consumer financial protection law,242
(2) overseeing mortgage servicers and loan promulgation,243 or (3) regulating
housing generally.244 Thus the Bureau did not act in an arbitrary and capricious
manner when consulting with these agencies as the “appropriate” agencies.245
Third, the Bureau must address any written objections brought up by
prudential regulators when issuing the final regulation.246 The final rule,
released on January 17, 2013, does not mention any written objections
submitted by prudential regulators. The Bureau reported that it received
approximately 300 comments on the Proposed Servicing Rules.247 The
comments came from consumers, community banks, credit unions, federal and
state regulators, community groups, and academics.248 The Bureau also
received comments from the government-sponsored enterprises and the
FHFA.249 There is no mention of any written comments or objections by

Servicemembers (June 21, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-and-prudential-regulators-issue-joint-guidance-to-address-mortgage-servicerpractices-that-impact-servicemembers/.
240 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,842–43.
241 Id.
242 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2006) (establishing and explaining HUD’s role under RESPA);
About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last
visited Aug. 16, 2013).
243 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), supra note 24 (discussing Ginnie Mae’s oversight of
mortgage servicers and loan promulgation); Home Loan Guaranty, U.S. DEPT. OF VETERAN AFF., http://
benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/index.asp?expandable=0 (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
244 See, e.g., Housing Mission and Goals, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.
aspx?Page=135 (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
245 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(B)
(Supp. V 2012).
246 See id. § 5512(b); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 20.
247 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed.
Reg. 10,696, 10,705 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
248 Id. at 10,705–06.
249 Id. at 10,706.
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prudential regulators. In the absence of any such written objections, the third
requirement is satisfied.
The Bureau’s interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s rulemaking
requirements is not arbitrary and capricious. Because the procedure used to
promulgate the amendment and the amendment’s substance are valid, the
amendments deserve deference as permissible interpretations of the Bureau’s
rulemaking power under the second step of Chevron.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF AMENDMENTS
The amendments to Regulation X show a significant departure from past
government efforts to regulate mortgage servicers. As discussed in Parts I and
II, regulation of mortgage servicing before the Dodd-Frank Act focused on
disclosures.250 The enforcing agencies did not have the authority to implement
recordkeeping requirements. The risks posed by poor servicer behavior were
not understood because “the information was not out there.”251 Additionally,
government programs since the financial crisis have focused on voluntary
incentive programs rather than regulations that mandate specific procedures.252
The amendments to Regulation X change regulatory gears because they
implement the Bureau’s supervisory powers over all servicers. The
amendments create uniformity of standards across the mortgage servicing
industry. The amendments also create uniform servicer behavior through the
collection of data. These data will allow the Bureau to monitor mortgage
servicers and enforce consumer financial protection law more effectively than
before the financial crisis. The data collection will also allow the Bureau to
refine and write new regulations by identifying problematic areas.

250

See supra Parts I–II.
Yuki Noguchi, New Mortgage Rules Would Limit Risky Lending, NPR (Jan. 10, 2013, 3:24 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2013/01/10/168979256/new-mortgage-rules-would-limit-risky-lending (quoting Susan
Wachter, a professor of real estate finance at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania).
252 See supra Part II.A.1.
251
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A. Immediate Effects
1. Industry Unity
The amendments unify all mortgage servicers under a single set of
regulations.253 This is a result of the Bureau’s authority over nondepository
entities.254 Previously, servicers who were not banking institutions could slip
under the regulatory radar.255 Now, however, the Bureau’s extended authority
and the amendments’ clarification that the requirements apply to all servicers
ensures compliance by all industry entities.256 The Bureau facilitates
compliance with the amendments by incorporating requirements from other
institutions, such as government-sponsored enterprises and the National
Mortgage Settlement.257 Under the amendments, all servicers must implement
and follow a standard set of procedures for communicating with delinquent
borrowers and reviewing loss mitigation applications.258
Industry experts believe that industry uniformity will create better
outcomes for consumers.259 The uniformity among industry players creates
fairness by providing industry-wide information about servicer activity and
raising the bar for the standard of servicer procedures.260 Additionally,
uniformity will provide borrowers with common expectations and outcomes
regarding communication with servicers and applications for loss mitigation
options.261

253 See Pete Mills, Senior Vice President, Residential Policy and Member Servs., Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
Remarks at the CFPB Field Hearing on Mortgage Policy (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/blog/live-from-atlanta-ga/.
254 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1024, 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1) (Supp.
V 2012); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 16.
255 See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 3, 4; Gordon, supra note 49; supra Part II.A.
256 See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 1, 9–11, 16.
257 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed.
Reg. 57,200, 57,205 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); supra Part II.B.
258 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,882–85 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.38–.41).
259 See, e.g., Mills, supra note 253.
260 See John Beggins, CEO, Specialized Loan Servicing, Remarks at the CFPB Field Hearing on
Mortgage Policy (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/live-from-atlanta-ga/.
261 See Mills, supra note 253.
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2. Data Creation
The Bureau’s supervisory function depends on the availability of data to
analyze supervised entities.262 The Bureau is responsible for implementing and
supervising compliance with federal consumer protection law.263 In order to
support the rules that it promulgates, the Bureau must monitor relevant markets
and consider such factors as the risks and costs associated with the purchase or
use of regulated products and the understanding that consumers have of
specific products and services.264
Under the amendments, servicers must record their communication and loss
mitigation efforts with borrowers by adhering to specific timelines, making
specific personnel personally accountable, and keeping borrower documents.265
The amendments have specific recordkeeping and filing requirements,266
including the recording of oral and written outreach efforts to delinquent
borrowers,267 the assignment of personnel to delinquent borrowers,268 and
servicer’s actions in reviewing loss mitigation applications.269
The amendments create an observable record of servicer behavior that is
subject to Bureau supervision. The files and procedures required by the
Regulation X amendments are subject to Bureau examination in accordance
with procedures in the Bureau’s Supervision and Examination Manual.270
Significant findings from Bureau examinations must be published in at least
one report each year.271 Prudential regulators and federal agencies that have
jurisdiction over the entity can access these reports.272

262 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, at Overview 3–
4, Examinations 3 (version 2, 2011) [hereinafter CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL].
263 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(1)
(Supp. V 2012).
264 See id. § 5512(c)(2).
265 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,882–85 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38–.41).
266 See id. at 10,883 (to be codified at § 1024.38(c)).
267 See id. (to be codified at § 1024.39).
268 See id. at 10,883–84 (to be codified at § 1024.40(a)).
269 See id. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at § 1024.41).
270 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(4)(A)
(Supp. V 2012); CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 262; see also Mortgage
Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10,697–98.
271 See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(3)(A).
272 See id. § 5512(c)(6)(C)(i).
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Requiring servicers to record their interactions with delinquent borrowers
creates accountability by allowing the Bureau to identify violations of federal
consumer protection laws. The Bureau is authorized to conduct investigations
to determine whether any entity has violated consumer protection laws.273 The
Bureau’s review of servicer action includes reviewing consumer complaints
and consumer surveys.274 The data from the amendments can be used to
corroborate consumer complaints and can be reinforced through the Bureau’s
powers to issue subpoenas, conduct hearings, and engage in joint
investigations with other federal agencies.275
The vesting of accountability in mortgage servicers and the Bureau’s
monitoring authority should lead to the efficient enforcement of federal
consumer protection laws. The Bureau intends to back the new rule with its
full enforcement and supervisory authority.276 The Bureau’s enforcement
powers over mortgage servicers range from limiting the activities a servicer
can participate in to notifying the public of violations and implementing hefty
consumer relief measures.277 Having data recording a servicer’s
communication with borrowers and compliance with consumer protection law
allows the Bureau to implement the most effective enforcement options when
it discovers instances of noncompliance.278
The data on servicer behavior will also allow the Bureau to identify gaps in
the amendment and promulgate new regulations in the future to
comprehensively regulate the mortgage servicing industry. The Bureau’s
Supervision and Examination Manual demonstrates a shift in regulatory focus

273 See id. §§ 5561(1), 5562(a); CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 262, at
Overview 1, 4.
274 See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(4)(B)(i).
275 See id. §§ 5562–5564, 5566. The Bureau has set up a formal system to receive, review, track, and
follow up on consumer complaints. See generally Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
276 See Cordray, supra note 9 (“We will be vigilant about enforcing these rules.”).
277 See 12 U.S.C. § 5565. The Bureau can charge penalties for violations of federal consumer protection
law up to $1 million. See id. § 5565(c). The Bureau’s first three enforcement actions against credit card
companies (Capital One Bank, Discover Bank, and American Express) for illegal practices, including
misleading consumers about fees and deceptive marketing, recovered $435 million in relief for 5.75 million
customers plus civil penalties of $101.5 million. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY
HIGHLIGHTS: FALL 2012, at 7 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_
supervisory-highlights-fall-2012.pdf.
278 Corrective action may be taken in conjunction with other federal agencies See CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, supra note 277, at 8 (describing a joint enforcement action against Capital One Bank with the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency after discovering noncompliance with federal consumer protection laws).
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from ensuring compliance with a law to identifying consumer risk.279 For
example, if the Bureau observes the data for servicers regarding the loss
mitigation application review procedures and finds that borrowers are being
denied loss mitigation options in specific patterns, the Bureau may promulgate
new regulations to address these patterns. The Bureau’s ability to create new
regulation for servicers in response to emerging patterns of behavior is
especially important because conventional market forces do not incentivize the
mortgage servicing industry.280 The data accumulated by the amendments will
allow the Bureau to identify consumer risk and promulgate laws to mitigate
that risk.
B. Potential Gaps for Further Regulation
Despite the strong impact of the amendments on the mortgage servicing
industry, Regulation X still has several gaps that the Bureau should fill with
further regulation. First, the amendments do not provide borrowers with a
guaranteed loss mitigation option, which may give servicers the opportunity to
avoid providing borrowers affordable loan modifications. Second, the
amendments do not give servicers a legal safe haven that would avoid violating
provisions of the servicers’ PSAs when opting to implement loss mitigation
efforts. Third, the amendments explicitly preempt areas of state foreclosure
law and although the amendments may lead to a decrease in the number of
foreclosures resulting from the dual-track system, preemption issues may
hinder this progress.
1. No Requirements for Choosing and Evaluating Loss Mitigation Options
Regulation X explicitly disclaims a requirement to provide borrowers with
loss mitigation options, stating that “[n]othing in § 1024.41 imposes a duty on
a servicer to provide any borrower with any specific loss mitigation option.”281
The Regulation X amendments do not require servicers to provide delinquent
borrowers with affordable loan modifications.282 Although borrowers have the
right to enforce the amendments’ loss mitigation application review provisions,

279 LINDA GALLAGHER & AMY MATSUO, KPMG, CFPB ISSUES FIRST SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION
MANUAL—MORTGAGE SERVICING GUIDELINES INCLUDED (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.kpmg.com/
US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/regulatory-practice-letters/Documents/rpl-11-25.pdf.
280 See supra Part I.A.
281 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed.
Reg. 10,696, 10,884 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)).
282 See Gordon, supra note 49.
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to receive notice of a servicer’s decision, and to appeal the denial of a loan
modification, servicers are not required to provide borrowers with any loss
mitigation option, far less an affordable loan modification.283 Without proper
restrictions, servicers are able to push through harmful, rather than sustainable,
loss mitigation options.284
Servicers are able to limit what loss mitigation options are available to
borrowers because servicers control the eligibility criteria for each option.285
As discussed in Part I, servicers compare the prospective outcomes of
foreclosure and various loss mitigation options through NPV calculations.286
Section C of Part I noted that there is no standard for what should be included
in an NPV calculation other than four vague factors, with no guidance as to
how those factors should be weighed.287 Under the amendments, servicers are
only required to reveal the inputs for NPV calculations when a borrower has
been denied a trial or permanent loan modification on the basis of the NPV
calculation.288 The Bureau has no basis to find fault with a servicer’s decision
to deny a borrower an affordable loan modification option if the servicer has
followed all of the required procedures.
Without strong restrictions on NPV calculations and a standard
methodology for loss mitigation decisions, mortgage servicers will continue to
have considerable discretion to implement unsustainable loss mitigation
options that are harmful to borrowers.289 Servicers have almost exclusive
discretion as to what values are entered into the NPV factors and have the
flexibility to consider additional factors including recouping costs, servicer
compensation, and the existence of junior liens on the property.290 These
additional factors incentivize servicers to pursue loss mitigation options that

283 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a), (d), (h)).
284 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 829 (“As long as servicers can choose not to perform modification,
they will, by and large, choose the path of least resistance—foreclosures and temporary modifications that strip
wealth from both investors and homeowners.”); supra Part I.C.
285 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,827.
286 See supra Part I.C.
287 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 37–40); supra Part I.C.
288 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed.
Reg. at 10,897 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d)(1) cmt. 2).
289 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 37–40); Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note
20.
290 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 41). For further reading on the incentives of mortgage
servicers, see id. (manuscript passim), Thompson, supra note 22, and Cordell et al., supra note 37.
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are harmful to borrowers, such as forbearing principal payments and
capitalizing arrears.291 Under the amendments, servicers are still able to
manipulate NPV formulas to justify their loss mitigation option decisions.
Although the amendments allow borrowers to enforce the review
requirements for loss mitigation applications through private action,292 the
amendments to Regulation X do not go far enough to provide borrowers with
access to affordable loan modifications as a form of loss mitigation. The
Bureau should use its rulemaking authority to issue additional regulations to
increase the certainty for borrowers to obtain affordable loan modifications.
First, the new regulations should require servicers to implement affordable
loan modifications for categories of homeowners for whom the foreclosure
process would be most detrimental, such as the elderly, low-income families,
or families suffering from an unexpected loss such as unemployment.293
Second, new regulations should be issued that grant the Bureau the right to
review and approve servicer NPV formulae and “waterfalls.” Review
procedures are in place for servicers subject to The National Mortgage
Settlement. Under the National Mortgage Settlement, the Bureau has the right
to obtain the servicer’s NPV formula.294 However, the factor-based nature of
NPV calculations means that the right to obtain the formula does little to
control servicer decisions. The Bureau should have the right to prohibit the use
of an NPV formula that leads to patterns of unsustainable loan modifications.
Similarly, the Bureau should be able to review servicer waterfalls to emphasize
principal and interest reduction efforts over detrimental modifications such as
the capitalization of arrears or the extension of a loan’s term.295 Although these
restrictions would conflict with PSA provisions, they would assure borrowers
of the possibility to stay in their homes and become current on their mortgages.

291 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 41); Thompson, supra note 22, at 772 (“Servicers can . . .
make more money by making short-term unsustainable payment agreements than they can by making longterm, sustainable modifications.”).
292 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed.
Reg. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)); see Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12
U.S.C. § 2605(f) (2006).
293 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates, Comments to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, NCLC.ORG 2 (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_
mortgage/mortgage_servicing/comments-cfpb-servicing-respa.pdf.
294 Antonio F. Dias, Lee Ann Russo & Albert J. Rota, CFPB to Play Significant Role Under Foreclosure
Settlement Proposal, JONES DAY (March 2011), http://www.jonesday.com/cfpb_to_play/.
295 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates, supra note 293, at 42–43.
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2. No Legal Safe Haven for Servicer Decisions
The amendments do not provide servicers with a legal shield for pursuing
loss mitigation options. Servicers have cited concerns with potential violations
of PSA provisions for modifying too many loans in a securitized pool as one
deterrent for implementing loan modifications.296 Many scholars claim that the
fear of investor lawsuits is “overblown” and there have been no suits by
investors against servicers that question a servicer’s decision to modify a
defaultant loan.297 Nevertheless, the lack of a legal shield from liability from
investors and trustees may mean that legal advisors for mortgage servicers
would suggest that servicers err on the side of caution and make loss mitigation
and foreclosure decisions that align with the language in the PSAs rather than
in the best interest of borrowers.
3. Dual-Track and Preemption Concerns
The amendments explicitly aim to restrict the dual-track system.298 The
dual-track system—which requires a servicer to proceed with the foreclosure
process while considering loss mitigation options—has led to foreclosures
even when borrowers thought they had successfully completed loss mitigation
discussions with servicers.299 The fourth amendment restricts unnecessary
foreclosures from the dual-track system in two ways. First, it creates a 120-day
buffer from taking any foreclosure action after a borrower’s delinquency.300
Second, once a borrower has submitted a loss mitigation application, even if
the account is more than 120 days delinquent, a servicer cannot initiate or
finalize the foreclosure process until loss mitigation options have been denied
or rejected, the appeals process is exhausted, or the borrower fails to comply
with the terms of the loss mitigation option.301
296

Some PSAs contain provisions that restrict the circumstances under which loans within a securitized
pool can be modified. See THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 5, 6, 8 (“Servicers have claimed to fear investor
lawsuits.”); McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 35–36).
297 THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 8.
298 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,698 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); supra Part I.B (describing the
dual-track system).
299 See The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous.,
Transp., & Cmty. Dev. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 6, 7 (2011)
[hereinafter Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp., and Cmty. Dev.] (statement of Diane E.
Thompson, Of Counsel, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.).
300 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,885 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1)).
301 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)–(g)).

DEWAR GALLEYSPROOFS2

218

9/24/2013 12:11 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:175

It is interesting that the Bureau did not eliminate the dual-track system,
despite professional recommendation to do so.302 Eliminating the dual-track
system would have been complicated since credit rating agencies and PSAs
generally require servicers to implement a dual-track system to maximize
efficiency.303 The Bureau could accomplish elimination of the dual-track
system prospectively by mandating a change in the standard PSA language.
Although the foreclosure buffers may stop servicers from pushing through
foreclosures hastily, the amendments do not guarantee that the problems and
foreclosures stemming from the dual-track system will go away. During the
120-day buffer, borrowers are not required to submit loss mitigation
applications, but merely told that the option is available.304 Borrowers might
not take advantage of the buffer time to pursue loss mitigation options.305 Once
the buffer has passed and none of the loss mitigation processing conditions
apply, servicers are unrestricted to implement the foreclosure process.306 At
this point, a borrower’s credit score takes a strong hit and administrative fees
begin to accumulate, regardless of whether the process actually ends with a
foreclosure.307
Beyond remaining complications for borrowers, the amendments
complicate state law. The amendments expressly preempt portions of state real
estate law.308 States may adopt broader consumer protection regulations, but
servicers must respect certain Bureau instructions, such as foreclosure
timelines, regardless of applicable state law.309 Preemption complicates

302 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp., and Cmty. Dev., supra note 299, at 7 (“The dualtrack system must be ended.”) (statement of Diane E. Thompson, Of Counsel, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.);
Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 20.
303 Thompson, supra note 22, at 795, 799.
304 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41).
305 Servicers have reported difficulties in making contact with delinquent borrowers and have suggested
that distressed borrowers may not respond to servicer outreach because the borrowers feel nothing can help
them or servicer contact may accelerate losing their home. See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 10.
306 See Gordon, supra note 49.
307 See id.
308 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78
Fed. Reg. at 10,877 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.33(d)).
309 See id. at 10,706 (“Specifically . . . § 1024.41(f) bars a servicer from making the first notice or filing
required for a foreclosure process unless a borrower is more than 120 days delinquent, notwithstanding that
state law may permit any such filing.”).

DEWAR GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

9/24/2013 12:11 PM

REGULATION X

219

foreclosure law where the 120-day buffer directly conflicts with state
foreclosure statutes.310
It would be beneficial to have an explanation and demonstration of
conformity between the Bureau’s regulations and state law. The Bureau
regulations render state foreclosure laws worthless for 120 days. It is unclear,
and arguably unlikely, that state legislatures will react to the Regulation X
amendments with changes to state foreclosure laws. Although the Bureau
makes clear in the amendments that servicers must follow the foreclosure
timelines in the amendments, the Bureau should issue an advisory opinion on
how servicers should consider the amendments’ restrictions alongside state
foreclosure procedures.
Overall, the immediate effects of the amendments outweigh the potential
gaps. The amendments to Regulation X represent a strong step by the Bureau
in the direction of regulating mortgage servicers and protecting borrowers from
unnecessary foreclosures. The amendments place the Bureau in a powerful
position to track servicer behavior and the Bureau is able to use its arsenal of
enforcement tools to efficiently enforce federal consumer protection law.
CONCLUSION
The Regulation X Amendments, requiring standard recordkeeping
procedures, early delinquent-borrower contact, continuity of contact, and loss
mitigation procedures by all servicers, demonstrate a new method of regulating
mortgage servicing. The amendments create a data record of servicer behavior
that allows the Bureau to efficiently enforce and, if necessary, rewrite federal
consumer protection law. Although there are gaps in the uniformly applied
requirements, the amendments pursue the Bureau’s goals of transparency and
accountability in mortgage servicing.
Importantly, the amendments to Regulation X are a legally permissible way
to control mortgage servicers under the second step of the Chevron doctrine.
Because the amendments are not contrary to the plain meaning of the statute,
an assumption of deference is appropriate. A reviewing court would be
required to defer to the Bureau’s regulations because the servicing
requirements, early contact requirements, continuity-of-contact procedures,
310 In some states, a nonjudicial foreclosure can be completed in as little as six weeks. The states with the
shortest foreclosure times are Georgia (thirty-seven days), Tennessee (forty to forty-five days) and Texas
(twenty-seven days). See Foreclosure Laws and Procedures by State, supra note 72.
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and loss mitigation procedures are reasonable interpretations, fulfilling
RESPA’s purpose to do what is necessary to protect consumers.
The amendments demonstrate a change in the government’s attitude toward
mortgage servicers. The amendments show that servicers are no longer seen as
passive entities, but as players in the financial marketplace whose actions have
distinct consequences. The amendments to Regulation X are a strong first step
in controlling servicer behavior but demonstrate that the Bureau still has much
to learn about the mortgage servicing industry.
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